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                      Feminism and Republicanism: Is This a Plausible Alliance?   
   
                                                   Anne Phillips
1
 
 
(This paper has been published in Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol 8, no 2, 2000) 
 
The relationship between feminism and republicanism has recently undergone a marked 
transformation, from erstwhile antagonists to possible friends. In its classical formulations, 
republicanism is far from woman-friendly. Indeed, there seem few traditions worse suited to 
alliance with feminism than one that has viewed freedom as a matter of what goes on in the 
public rather than private realm, and has regarded the homely activities of the domestic sphere 
as a drain on the manly heroisms of public life. Yet there have been moves in recent years to 
realign feminism with the republican tradition, one measure of this being the unexpected revival 
of interest in Hannah Arendt. Once dismissed as hopelessly 'male-stream' in her contempt for 
household idiocy and glorification of the public realm
2
, Arendt has since been recruited as a 
potential source for women's movement politics. Mary Dietz sees her as an important counter-
weight to those strands of feminism that have sentimentalised the virtues of the private sphere, 
and describes her as providing feminist thinkers 'with a way to proceed towards politics'.
3
 A 
recent collection is entirely devoted to feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt.
4
   
 Republicanism is being reclaimed as one of the formative influences on feminism - 
perhaps as influential as the liberalism that once took most of the credit
5
 - and a number of 
theorists argue that women would do well to draw more closely on this heritage. It has been 
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suggested that feminism could consolidate its already strong commitment to participatory 
democracy if it aligned itself with the republican rather than liberal tradition
6
; that such an 
alignment would make it easier to detach the case for women's political representation from 
narrow notions about women representing only women’s interests7; or make it easier for 
feminists to distance themselves from the divisiveness of identity politics.
8
  
In her introduction to a collection of readings on Feminism, the Public and the 
Private,
9
 Joan Landes makes the point that the feminist preoccupation with personal life should 
not be seen as a backing away from public participation. On the contrary, since feminist politics 
has been very much about making public matters that were previously considered private, it has 
usually attached great weight to activities in the public sphere. In recent years, this more ‘public’ 
face of feminism has been most evident in the critical dialogue that has developed with 
Habermasian analyses of the public sphere
10
 and, more generally, in feminist explorations of 
communicative and deliberative democracy
11
, for much of the work on civic republicanism has 
taken a communitarian turn that many feminists find more troubling. But whether the links with 
republicanism are direct or tangential, there is undoubtedly a new focus in feminist writing on 
the nature of the public sphere. Discussions that once focused on feminism's uneasy positioning 
between liberal and socialist traditions now more commonly invoke republicanism as well. 
           Why Republicanism? 
This revival of interest parallels a wider recuperation in contemporary political thought. 
Inspired particularly by the work of J.G.A.Pocock and Quentin Skinner
12
, historians of ideas 
have been excavating a distinctively republican tradition from the distortions and 
misrepresentations that piled up in subsequent centuries; in doing so, they have significantly 
altered our understanding of the Western political heritage.
13
 For most of those involved in this 
process of historical correction, the recuperation of republicanism has been a political as well as 
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intellectual project. Variously called upon as a critique of liberalism, totalitarianism, and the 
vapidity of mass society, the tradition has provided an alternative vantagepoint from which to 
view the inadequacies of the contemporary world.  
Hannah Arendt was a crucial early figure in this realignment, and in Arendt’s diagnosis 
of twentieth century ailments, just about everything one could think of had gone wrong. In its 
terrifying combination of 'reckless optimism' with 'reckless despair'
14
, totalitarianism had 
abdicated responsibility for human action and choice: no need to agonise over what is just or 
legitimate; put yourself at the service of inexorable forces; let the ends justify the means. In the 
more protected zones of constitutional democracy, there was also little cause for celebration. 
Arendt saw the political order being downgraded to the status of a marketplace, with politics 
becoming the pursuit of interest or administration of economic growth. Even the more humane 
concern with poverty or hunger was, in her view, an abdication of political freedom, for when 
the poor 'appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them.... freedom had to be 
surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life-process itself'.
15
 People had come to believe 
they lived in a free republic if they only had their civil rights and freedoms; but they had 
mistaken the 'preliminaries of civilised government'
16
 for its substance, and forgotten that 
'political freedom, generally speaking, means the right "to be a participator in government", or it 
means nothing.'
17
 In pursuit of first the necessities and later the luxuries of life, people had lost 
their taste for public freedom. Politics had effectively disappeared. 
 On a number of points, Arendt's version of republicanism has become deeply 
unfashionable. Few now endorse the preference she suggested for direct over representative 
democracy, while no-one argues that the vitality of public life depends on keeping 'social' 
questions about poverty or hunger so resolutely out of debate. Most also distance themselves 
from an element that was never part of Arendt's thinking: the image of the republic as a 
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homogeneous community reaching agreement on its common good. At a deeper level, however, 
late twentieth century discussions of republicanism have continued to develop the thesis about 
the individual getting the better of the citizen, and J.G.A.Pocock has described his work on civic 
humanism as telling its story 'in terms borrowed from or suggested by the language of Hannah 
Arendt'
18
. Among political philosophers, the continuities have been particularly marked: 
Sheldon Wolin's analysis of the history of Western political thought as the history of the 
subordination of politics to society
19
; Michael Sandel's contention that democracy is now valued 
only as a way of securing people in the pursuit of their private (by implication, rather sordid) 
interests and ends
20
; or Benjamin Barber's critique of liberal politics as akin to zoo-keeping, 
dedicated only to keeping the wild beasts apart.
21
 
 In its later twentieth-century incarnation, republicanism has come to revolve around 
three themes. (None of these, it should be noted, has much to say on the more popular 
understanding of republicanism as a critique of monarchical power). There is a distaste for 
interest-group pluralism as reducing politics to an amoral bargaining and exchange; a 
dissatisfaction with definitions of freedom as merely the freedom from coercion or interference; 
and a perception that contemporary societies are experiencing a worrying decline in the quality 
of their public life. Interest-group pluralism had been criticised by Marxists for glossing over the 
systemic inequalities that leave one group incomparably more powerful than another. From the 
perspective of the latter-day republican, the further problem is that the huckstering and 
bargaining of contemporary politics leaves no space for considerations of what is right or just, 
no space for deliberation on public affairs. When public policy is treated as a by-product of 
competing private interest (in Harold Lasswell's famous phrase, a matter of who gets what, 
when, and how), this not only disadvantages the weaker groups in society. It also empties the 
'public' of any real meaning, making a mockery of notions of the public good. For most of those 
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who develop this theme, the intention is not to resuscitate Rousseauian fantasies of a general 
will; most contemporary republicans have been as suspicious as anyone of appeals to a unified 
common good. But public interest should not be treated just as an amalgam of private 
preferences. Public life should be more than a vehicle for looking after one's own. 
 The second theme addresses what has become a dominant understanding of freedom in 
modern liberal democracies: the notion that individuals are free so long as no-one interferes 
with them, so long as no-one stops them doing what they have chosen to do. Here too, there has 
been a classically Marxist critique, to the effect that it is nonsensical to describe people as free 
just because no-one holds a gun to their heads, and that failing the material resources that enable 
people to activate their so-called choices, 'freedom' remains an empty word. The republican 
response (particularly as developed in works by Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit
22
) focuses 
more on relations of dependency and domination. If freedom were simply a matter of non-
interference, we might have to say that a slave left alone by a lazy or absentee master enjoyed 
full liberty; or that a wife cherished by her accommodating husband was as free as a bird, even 
when the laws of her society denied her any independent status. In the republican conception, 
neither of these would make much sense. A people that lives at the discretion of its rulers cannot 
be described as free, even when fortunate enough to live under rulers who choose not to 
interfere. Servitude is servitude even when the master is accommodating. The only free people 
are those who govern themselves.  
 The third concern that underpins much of the current interest in republicanism is the 
belief that modernity has tipped the balance from the public towards the private, reduced the 
role of public discussion or the use of public space, and generally contributed to what Richard 
Sennett calls 'the fall of public man'.
23
  Some explain this by reference to a proceduralist 
liberalism that backs away from substantive public discussion of disputed issues of politics or 
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morality, and tries to cope with the pluralism of modern society by leaving more matters up to 
the individuals themselves.
24
 But the processes at work are also economic and social: a 
continuing marketisation that turns previously public activities into matters for private 
consumption; a pre-packaging of opinions through the mass media that discourages political 
dialogue and deliberation; an intensification of labour that leads people to seek their fulfilment 
primarily at home. Though the details are continually contested, there is a widely shared 
perception that public life has been impoverished and public spiritedness is on the decline. 
Much of the current interest in republicanism speaks to this concern. 
                    Feminist Connections 
On each of these themes, there are points of contact and points of contention with feminist 
thinking. This is not only because feminisms are various, ranging through almost every point on 
the liberal/communitarian axis or every point in the modernity/post-modernity debate. It is also, 
more interestingly, because those drawn to the republican tradition have also turned out to be 
those most critical of the way its exponents develop their themes. The critique of interest-driven 
politics, for example, has been welcomed for the way it opens up the possibility of a politics 
devoted to justice, but simultaneously condemned for depriving women of their distinct or 
separate voice. The critique of dependency resonates powerfully with a long history of women’s 
movement politics, but to the extent that it conceives of independence as a political – rather than 
social and economic – condition, it is also out of tune with many later preoccupations. The 
importance attached to the sphere of public life speaks volumes to the women who have long 
felt excluded from this sphere, but also infuriates with its seeming disparagement of those 
activities that have continued to define most women’s lives. The resulting ambiguities make for 
a complex relationship, which is best understood against the background of feminism’s 
persistent unease with the liberal tradition. Feminism was born (in a sense) out of liberalism, but 
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has nearly always been at odds with its origins, and feminists have long sought inspiration in 
traditions that contest the liberal hegemony. For many post-sixties’ feminists, it was a revised 
version of socialism that provided the framework for this, but as socialism lost its organising 
power (partly because of those feminist revisions) it became necessary to look elsewhere. Part 
of the contemporary attraction of republicanism is that it offers a substitute for socialism as a 
way of maintaining the necessary distance from the liberal tradition. 
1. Interest 
The republican critique of interest-group politics resonates with a longstanding feminist 
dissatisfaction with the politics of the marketplace: a perception that the politics of bargains and 
contracts will reinforce the position of those groups that are already more powerful; but also a 
deeper perception that it is at odds with female experience. The relationship of mothers to 
children, for example, often involves putting the needs of others above one’s own, and a 
concern for the empowerment of one’s children who will then grow away from one into 
independence. Redescribing this in terms of a rational pursuit of long-term interest (you do your 
best for your children either because they are ‘your own’ or so that they can repay you at some 
later stage) hardly captures the nature of this relationship, and feminist reflection on this has 
generated a substantial literature on the ethics of care.
25
 Most feminist work on citizenship and 
democracy draws on this to some extent, and it is widely argued that the inclusion of women as 
full citizens should alter the texture of democratic politics as well as its personnel.
26
 The 
obsession with self and self-ownership is a luxury few women have been able to afford; to this 
extent, it has been felt to reflect a very masculine conception of politics. 
 The second reason why interest seems such a poor vehicle for feminist concerns is that it 
suggests something pre-given and fixed. Underlying virtually all feminist politics is a belief that 
we have grown up in inequitable power relations, and that women, as well as men, may 
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internalise these relations to make them seem inevitable or right. It is only rarely that people can 
make the imaginative leap into entirely different relations and the claims we then make (or the 
interests we express) often appear as mild variants on current conditions. Thus, mothers living 
in a society that has long practised female genital mutilation may well express the wish that 
their daughters should be operated on in more hygienic conditions than they experienced 
themselves, but may find it harder simply to refuse the operation because of a fear that this will 
make their daughters unmarriageable. Wives living in a society that has long allocated all the 
domestic labour to women may express a wish that men should take more of their share, but 
often find the demand for total equalisation inappropriate, utopian, ‘unnatural’. Freud was not 
the only one to feel confused about what women want, for wants are formed under the 
constraints of existing conditions, and they alter when new possibilities emerge. One problem 
with the interest-driven conception of politics is that it finds it hard to address this phenomenon. 
This makes it a poor vehicle for any politics that is about challenging deep structures and age-
old relations. 
For both these reasons, feminists find much that is congenial in the republican critique, 
but usually stop short at the point where republicanism threatens to abandon a belief in conflicts 
of interest. Particularly in its incarnations in the USA (where there is an understandable 
revulsion against what political scientists term 'pork-barrel' politics), civic republicanism has 
come to be associated with ideals of transcendence, with appeals to citizens to turn away from 
their selfish, parochial preoccupations to address matters of more general concern. Invoking 
ideals of public virtue against private selfishness, many republicans look to the institutions of 
self-government to achieve something grander than just the protection of individual or group 
interest: something more along the lines of just laws, the greatest mutual benefit, perhaps 
even that old chestnut, the common good.  Sandel, for example, not only sets a high value on 
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public service and political participation. He also sees freedom as depending on the 
willingness to put the common good above private interests and concerns. This rings alarm 
bells for feminists, many of whom will ask what guarantee there is that women's interests and 
preoccupations will be incorporated into this ‘common’ good. Almost by definition, women's 
politics insists on there being some difference between men's and women's interests – some 
difference and also some conflict - and it is often the moment when women come to recognise 
this difference that sparks off their mobilisation. ‘From the vantage-point of women’s history,’ 
writes Mary Ryan, ‘the identification of a political interest of one’s own was not a fall from 
public virtue but a step towards empowerment’27 Women have typically had to shake 
themselves loose from submissiveness, to make themselves less rather than more self-denying, 
and this experience puts a more positive gloss on assertions of self or group interest. 
 Joan Landes notes that 'when women during the French Revolution and the 
nineteenth century attempted to organize in public on the basis of their interests, they risked 
violating the constitutive principles of the bourgeois public sphere: in place of one, they 
substituted the many; in place of disinterestedness, they revealed themselves to have an 
interest.'
28
  The most misogynist elements of republicanism have disappeared from late 
twentieth century variants, and there is now little of that celebration of manly heroisms, and 
associated disdain for the ‘mere’ female, that can be observed in earlier versions. But 
wherever republicanism comes to celebrate disinterestedness or generality, it threatens to 
undercut what has been a persistent feminist concern. As Iris Young famously argued in her 
critique of Benjamin Barber: 'In a society where some groups are privileged while others are 
oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations 
and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege; for 
the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, 
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marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.'
29
 Premature appeals to disinterestedness or 
impartiality place a particularly heavy burden on groups that are just beginning to articulate 
their distinctive concerns, twisting assertions of need into claims of pure selfishness and 
reducing people to silence again. 
 Consider in this context Robert Putnam's analysis of civic traditions in modern Italy, 
which turns partly on a discussion of the personal preference vote. At the time of his analysis, 
Italian elections were conducted on the basis of party lists, with voters having the additional 
opportunity to indicate their preference between individuals. In Putnam's comparison between 
North and South - between regions with a strong sense of civic involvement and others where 
patron-client politics still prevails - he sees the use of the personal preference vote as 
indicating the absence of a civic community. '(I)n the least civic regions, such as Calabria, 
voters are brought to the polls not by issues, but by hierarchical patron-client networks'. 'More 
than half of the citizens in the civic regions have never cast a preference ballot in their lives; 
more than half of the voters in the less civic regions say they always have.'
30
  
One can see, of course, what he means. There is a difference between voting for 
someone who shares your political aspirations and voting for someone who knows your father 
or has promised you a job, and the first suggests a more vibrant and informed political culture 
than the second. The example recalls, however, broadly similar voting systems that operate 
elsewhere in Europe, where the opportunity to indicate a personal preference has been 
exploited by women's groups to raise the proportion of women elected. Putnam sees the 'good 
polity' as characterised by the citizens' engagement with public issues and corresponding lack 
of interest in personalities, but for anyone seeking to challenge the male monopoly on 
politics, this is an oversharp dichotomy. When citizens abdicate to the party the responsibility 
for ranking individuals, they may be saying (in good republican fashion) that their votes are 
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not for purchase and their support entirely a matter of political programmes and ideas. But 
this lack of interest in the individual also commits them to saying they do not care whether 
the preferred candidate is male or female, white or black, from an over-represented majority 
or an under-represented minority. Feminists cannot afford to be so disdainful of ’personal’ 
difference. Indeed, anyone concerned about the under-representation of subordinated social 
groups has to regard the choice of individual as an additional salient concern. Putnam’s high-
minded contrast between civic virtue and patron-client relations makes it harder to recognise 
the legitimacy of this. 
This emphasis on particularity and difference opens up what may seem an impossible 
distance from republican thinking, but there is a further turn in the cycle that begins to close 
this again. Feminism has always, in some sense, been about challenging false unities: 
challenging the assumption that the family is a harmonious unit, that members of the same 
household necessarily share the same interests, or that 'man' can stand in for 'man and woman' 
as if the two sexes would never disagree. Because of this, feminists have proved particularly 
sensitive to the further differentiations that also make 'woman' a false unity: the multiple 
differences between women of class, age, ethnicity, sexuality, and race. The fragmentation 
implied in this is one problem feminism has had to face. The other is that if we put too much 
stress on difference - on the fact that people have different experiences and different interests, 
and that those with one set of experiences cannot  'stand in' for those with another - we seem 
to legitimate a vision of politics in which no-one addresses anyone else's concerns and each 
just looks after her own.  
If we say, for example, that men cannot be relied upon to recognise and defend 
women's interests (I find it hard to see how anyone could consider herself a feminist if she did 
not argue some version of this), are we saying men should leave so-called women's concerns 
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to the women and women leave men's concerns to the men? If we say that white women 
cannot be relied upon to recognise and act on the problems of racism, are we saying racism is 
only a problem for black people and does not have to be addressed by those who are white? In 
both cases, the first statement seems absolutely right: our different experiences do influence 
and constrain our understandings of the world, and we have to be very wary of unities that 
turn out to be false. But if the implication is that the members of one group have no 
responsibility towards the members of another - no capacity even for understanding their 
different point of view – few of us would want to pursue that road. At this point, 
republicanism comes back into its own, offering a more dialogic understanding of public 
justice and public good that can be a useful resource in addressing this issue. As many of 
those developing the case for deliberative democracy have argued, the very requirement of 
publicity – having to engage with others in public, to take on board different arguments and 
perspectives, to frame our own demands in terms that will be compelling to those with whom 
we disagree – should encourage a more transformative politics that enables everyone to move 
beyond our initial, more local concerns. The more ‘private’ politics of the ballot box is 
unlikely to have this effect.
31
 
2. Dependency 
The republican critique of dependency and domination also has obvious resonance with 
feminism, particularly as developed in Philip Pettit’s recent work. Pettit argues that the defining 
core of the republican tradition lies less in ideals of active political participation or the pursuit 
of common interest than in the notion of freedom as non-domination, and he presents a 
version that is far less severe in its separation of public from private concerns. On his reading, 
the res publica side of republicanism becomes less prominent. It is exposure to the arbitrary 
will of another that emerges as the greatest evil in the republican canon, and while most of the 
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classical literature has focused attention on exposure to tyrannical and unchecked rulers, there 
is no reason why the same concerns should not apply to the dominance of employers over 
workers or the dominance of husbands over wives. 
Pettit draws extensively on the experiences of women to clarify why living with a kindly 
master is still living unfree, and in doing so, echoes what has long been a feminist concern. 
Women in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were well aware that the chains of servitude 
could be wrought from silk and lace, and they rarely endorsed the argument that dependency is 
acceptable so long as dependants are ‘allowed’ to do what they want to do. Mary Wollstonecraft 
is one of the theorists most obviously indebted to republican thinking, and the real horror for her 
was not women’s poverty or terrible conditions of work, but their dependency on and 
domination by men. So long as society attached such exaggerated weight to sexual difference 
(Wollstonecraft pulled no punches in identifying men as the instigators of this) then women 
would be unable to develop their physical strength, their moral courage, or their capacities for 
rational action. Criticising 'the state of degradation to which woman is reduced'
32
, she argued 
that women's senses had been inflamed and their understandings neglected. They had been 
encouraged to exaggerate their physical frailty rather than build their bodily strength; they were 
supposed to be innocent - read ignorant; to refine their taste rather than their understanding; to 
play off contemptible infantile airs in the attempt to excite male desire. Poorer women escaped 
the worst effects of femininity simply because they had to work, therefore had to be strong and 
capable. Some aristocratic women escaped the worst effects because they wielded economic 
power. But women of the middle classes had been turned into empty-headed and manipulative 
emblems of sexuality, encouraged to get their way through flattery and deceit, and taught to 
abdicate moral responsibility for their lives.   
The example speaks to a strong association between feminism and republicanism in 
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the formative years of feminist thinking, but it also clarifies why that association later became 
more weak. Wollstonecraft was preoccupied with questions of dependence and independence, 
domination and freedom, and while she saw independence as conditional on certain social 
changes (mainly in the sphere of education), she had little of the later nineteenth century 
preoccupation with material equality as a condition for freedom. Thus, she hated aristocratic 
wealth, but more for its luxury, decadence, degenerative influence than for the inequalities it 
represented in terms of the distribution of income and wealth. And while acutely sensitive to 
the harsh conditions of many working women's lives, she tended to regard poorer women 
almost as better off than those living on higher incomes. Like many feminists trying to make 
sense of the peculiar patterns developing through late eighteenth/ early nineteenth century 
Europe, she came to believe that the caged beauties of the middle class were more dominated, 
degraded and infantilised than the hard-working women of the lower class. This meant, 
among other things, that Wollstonecraft saw poverty as less of a threat to liberty than 
dependency. The equality she sought was to be measured in terms of independence rather 
than income or positioning in the social division of labour; and she saw no intrinsic reason 
why men and women could not be equally independent even while assuming very different 
responsibilities and roles.  
This is the point that has proved so troubling to later feminists, for Wollstonecraft 
does not seem particularly perturbed by a division of labour that allocates familial and 
domestic responsibilities to the women and leaves most fields of public employment to the 
men. Some have explained this just as an understandable failure of imagination, for who 
could have anticipated, at the end of the eighteenth century, that women might come to join 
the labour force in equal numbers with men or men take equal responsibility for their 
children? (Who can anticipate this even now?) But to ‘excuse’ her in this way is itself a 
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failure of imagination, for what Wollstonecraft’s arguments reveal is her deep conviction that 
it is the capacity to think and act for yourself that matters rather than one’s place in the 
division of labour or one’s level of income and wealth. What she was saying, in effect, was 
that it matters less what you do than how you do it. You have to be free from the domination 
of others, you have to be serious not silly, you have to be governing yourself. But if these 
conditions are once met, then a woman running her household and bringing up her children 
can be as free and worthy of respect as anyone running the country or earning vast monies in 
the more public world of work. Indeed, for the middle class women Wollstonecraft saw as 
aping the life-styles of the aristocracy - refusing to breast-feed or educate their children, 
refusing to soil their hands on domestic labour or turn their minds to the management of their 
home - the resumption of domestic and family responsibilities would be the real saving of 
their souls. 
There is a strand of contemporary feminism that works to reclaim the value of 
mothering and therefore sounds rather similar to this. But for most of the twentieth century, 
Wollstonecraft's perception that independence and self-respect come more from how you live 
your life than from what that life consists in has been out of tune with the dominant concerns. 
Through this century, it is the stark material inequalities between women and men that have 
captured most attention: the poverty and malnutrition of women struggling to feed their 
children on whatever their husbands passed on from their breadwinners' wage; the persistent 
gap between average male and average female earnings; the impossibly long hours women 
worked at their domestic tasks even when they also went out to work. Sometimes the 
campaign focus has been on what we have come to term 'equality' issues: winning the right to 
the same kind of education as boys; ending the discriminatory practices that continued to keep 
women out of better paid jobs and professions; battling for equality of pay. Sometimes the 
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focus has been more on what we call 'difference' issues: working to improve the health of 
mothers and children; to expand nursery provision; to secure women from the violence of 
men. It is not that dependency has become less of an issue for twentieth century feminists, but 
that the battle against this dependency has come to centre more decisively on social and 
economic reform. It has also increasingly invoked visions of strict equality. 
To be independent is, as Wollstonecraft believed, a matter of how you view yourself and 
how you are viewed by others. But the idea that you can achieve this recognition while 
continuing to occupy what was traditionally a subordinate female zone has come to seem deeply 
implausible. There are, of course, many differences that are compatible with equality: it should 
not be necessary for us all to share the same religious or political beliefs in order to be recognised 
as equals; it should not be necessary for us to enjoy the same music or eat the same food; and it 
certainly should not be necessary for us to demonstrate the same athletic or academic capabilities. 
But where difference has been so long overlaid with inequality – as in the different 
responsibilities so long allocated to women and men – it is hard to out one’s confidence in a 
scenario that promises full equality and independence yet leaves us attached to different spheres 
of activity. The point here is that feminist analysis of women's subordination has been profoundly 
influenced by the materialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the more 
comprehensive egalitarianism that developed out of this. This may not be intrinsically at odds 
with republican thinking, but where republicanism focuses attention on the political framework 
within which we can  challenge domination, feminism is more likely to emphasise the 
background inequalities that contribute to this.
33
 
3 The public sphere 
On the face of it, republican appeals to a revitalised public might seem to have the least to say to 
feminist politics, but such a view would misread decades of women’s campaigning for access to 
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the public realm. Feminists have been fiercely critical, of course, of the stark separation between 
public and private, and the disparagement of the domestic and familial so often associated with 
this. Through much of the last two centuries, however, access to the public sphere has been one 
of the defining demands of the women’s movement, and women have felt acutely their loss of a 
public life. One of the ironies, as Mary Ryan
34
 points out, is that women's eventual incursions 
into the public turned out to coincide with a period widely regarded as one of decline (a typical 
experience for women, who often find themselves gaining access to jobs or institutions just at 
the moment when these lose their power). But however critical feminists have been of the 
elevation of public over private, most have continued to view participation in public life as a 
key constituent of human freedom. This has always been a point of contact with republican 
thinking. 
 The point of dissension is that republicanism still operates with an oversharp 
dichotomy between public and private; this is also true of that wider body of literature that 
addresses the seeming decline of the public sphere. The issue here is conceptual as well as 
practical, for the allocation of men to the public and women to the private is in large part a 
conceptual move. It is not just that women turn out to occupy one corner of society while men 
occupy another; it is also – and nowadays perhaps more so - that the activities associated with 
women have been treated, almost by definition, as private. Women have then faced both 
practical and definitional exclusion: a practical exclusion that can be measured in their lesser 
participation in the labour market or world of politics; and a definitional exclusion that 
operates through categorising what they do as less political. 
This is one of the themes Bonnie Honig develops in her discussion of Hannah Arendt. 
Arendt's ‘rigid and uncompromising public/private distinction’35 was itself a political act: 
Arendt saw public life as threatened by the deadening intrusion of the body  (with all its self-
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evident, and therefore to her, politically uninteresting needs) and she deployed the distinction 
between public and private partly as a way of protecting the sphere of political action. The 
distinction is then far from innocent, for when that-which-has–to-be-excluded overlaps so 
closely with women’s lives, it begins to figure as one of the mechanisms for keeping women 
in their place. Armed with this insight (part of what was meant by ‘the personal is political’), 
feminists have queried the narrow definitions of the public sphere they find in the writings of 
republicans and their near allies. One consequence is that they are less impressed by evidence 
of a process of substantive decline. 
Thus Seyla Benhabib takes Arendt to task for trying to define the public sphere in 
relation to certain types of activity, and argues that any matter can enter public space once it 
becomes matter of public dispute
36
. On this analysis, it would make no sense to cite the 
changing subject-matter of political debate (from heroic deeds to economic needs, or even to 
the division of housework between women and men) as evidence that public life is on the 
decline. In similar vein, Nancy Fraser argues that it is misleading to talk of ‘the’ public sphere 
– conjuring up as this does images of a parliamentary chamber – and more illuminating to 
refer to a multiplicity of publics, organised around different networks of public 
communication.
37
 On this analysis, we could not cite citizen apathy on national issues as 
decisive evidence of decline, for this might well coincide with a bustling proliferation of 
‘counterpublics’ each energetically debating alternatives. The feminist critique of the 
public/private distinction generates a far more plural and decentred understanding of what 
constitutes public life, and this undercuts some of the more damning analyses of political 
decline. 
Positions on this are subtle: a jaundiced observer might even charge them with 
inconsistency. Anyone engaging with the literature on the public sphere does so out of 
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dissatisfaction with a model of politics that presents it as the protection of individual 
freedoms or promotion of individual interests, and most of those engaging with this literature 
would say there is a deficiency, even a crisis, in contemporary public life. Many feminists 
share this perception, even if they are more commonly found debating Habermas or the 
relevance of deliberative democracy than engaging with republicanism per se. But feminists 
have also wanted to contest the rigid distinction between public and private that defines so 
much characteristically ‘female’ activity as non-political and leaves so much of what we call 
‘women’s issues’ outside the scope of public life. So where others might look back 
nostalgically to a high point of public interaction, feminists are more prone to point out that 
the great moments in the history of the public sphere were themselves moments of female 
exclusion; and where others might bemoan the growth of either interest or identity politics, 
feminists are more likely to query the assumption that these are antithetical to the public 
good. Feminists have noted stirrings of political activity in unexpected places – in some 
cases, even underground
38
  - and while this sometimes leads to an over-sanguine reading of 
contemporary politics, it is an important corrective to the more doomsday scenarios that 
project a process of historical decline.  
Conclusion 
All this adds up to a perception of republicanism as an uneasy ally. When the tradition was 
born out of such resolutely masculine origins, this is hardly a surprising finding. The fact that 
feminists have simultaneously found much to admire and much to condemn is also 
unsurprising, for there is no pre-feminist tradition of political thought that can be adopted 
wholesale as a basis for sexual politics. That republicanism nonetheless attracts increasing 
feminist interest testifies, as much as anything, to the search for an alternative to the liberal 
tradition. Feminism is very much a child of liberalism: informed by a similar critique of 
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ascribed positions and traditional hierarchies, a similar commitment to individual autonomy, 
a similar belief that humans are born equal whatever the other characteristics of their lives. 
But that liberal tradition developed for too long as an exclusively masculine preserve, and the 
assumptions that came to be built into it have disturbed generations of feminist activists. For 
much of the twentieth century, feminists sought to moderate the excesses of liberalism by 
welding onto it some elements of socialist thinking; now that socialism is itself in disarray, 
republicanism looks a more likely ally. 
Liberalism is associated with the view that society is divided between many 
competing interests and that each has to look after its own. Socialism is associated with the 
view that solidarity comes from shared interests, and that these are overwhelmingly the 
shared interests of class. The summaries are too simplistic, but if these are the alternatives on 
offer, it is easy to understand why republicanism has come back into favour. Despite the 
problems I have indicated  (downplaying genuine conflicts of interest, failing to recognise the 
empowerment attached to articulating distinct and separate concerns, focusing on the 
political, often to the exclusion of the social and economic, and idealising a once lively public 
that was never very lively for women), this is a tradition that offers a different way of 
conceiving the relationship between self and others, and a different way of thinking about 
public life. Any attempt to swallow it wholesale would be seriously mistaken (difficult, 
anyway, given that ‘it’ varies significantly in its current incarnations). But in that tension 
between insisting that different groups do have distinct and different interests and nonetheless 
 projecting a vision of politics as something more than looking after yourself, a sufficiently 
cagey appropriation of republicanism offers one possible resource.  
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